Creating a Stable Korean Peninsula

Does North Korea really want a stable Korean Peninsula?  Going by the reactions of the international community after Pyongyang acts in provocative, and sometimes belligerent ways, the answer appears to be no.  North Korea has developed a foreign policy where behavior that destabilizes the region, such as testing two nuclear weapons and firing ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, results in a boost in foreign aid and diplomatic relations from the international community.  In this paper, I will outline why and how North Korea has created a system where it benefits from an unstable Korean Peninsula, and propose a strategy to alter this behavior that the United States government has yet to consider.

North Korea’s policy of intentionally destabilizing the Peninsula with the intention of reaping economic rewards was born out of financial desperation beginning after the fall of the Soviet Union.  North Korea was unable to absorb the loss of trade with Moscow, which amounted to under $100 million in 1994, an astonishing one-thirtieth of what it accounted for in 1990.  While China tried to assist North Korea by boosting aid, it was never as stable as the support Pyongyang received from Moscow, nor did it equal ½ of what Moscow provided before 1990.  Couple this economic shock with the disastrous floods of 1995 and 1996, where in one particular day it rained just under 35 inches (the combined annual rainfall of North Dakota and Colorado is 32.5 inches), and you are left with a country whose economy is completely based on support from outside countries.  While a traditional response to such an economic crisis would be to open up markets to the international community to boost trade, Pyongyang refused.  The power of the North Korean leadership comes from the citizen’s belief that their leaders are sacrosanct and the only thing keeping them safe from a violent and destructive outside world—a world they know very little about.  Allowing such trade would seriously undermine that power.  Instead, North Korea created a system where it benefits financially from creating a hostile environment on the Korean Peninsula.

An example of this occurred in 1994, when North Korea banned inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), and removed spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor.  This action tacitly declared North Korea was pursuing nuclear weapons and created the possibility of an all-out war on the Peninsula.  To calm tensions, the US sent former president Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong-illl, the “Dear Leader” of North Korea.  This meeting resulted in four months of negotiations between the US and North Korea.  The outcome was a promise from North Korea to halt and dismantle their nuclear program (a promise they did not keep) in return for America providing two light water reactors, with annual shipments of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per annum until the reactors were operational.  While rationality dictated making a deal with North Korea to avoid a possible war, it highlights the riskiness, yet fruitfulness of North Korean foreign policy.

In a study conducted by Victor Cha at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a troubling trend was uncovered.  Since 1984, a period of dialogue opened up with the US resulting in North Korea gaining something it needed within six months of every provocative North Korea action.  This method of using provocative, military actions to derive aid from foreign countries fits well with how Pyongyang maintains power over the North Korean people.  By showing its citizenry that it uses military force to attack foreign states, it reinforces the indoctrinated belief that the North Korean leaders are vital in protecting them from the outside world. 

While predicting when North Korea will engage in destabilizing actions on the Korean Peninsula is difficult, when they will not attack is far easier to envisage.  North Korea has demonstrated a pattern of behaving when they are at the negotiating table with America (with one exception in 1998).  Because of this pattern, it would be interesting to see if creating a mechanism that brings North Korea to the negotiating table for sustained discussions would alter their current policy.  The 6-party talks, which have all but broken down after the newly appointed Kim Jong-eun fired a ballistic missile in 2011, was not the perfect model for such an institution, but it did lay the framework of what such a mechanism could look like.  The 6-party talks (consisting of the US, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China as the chair) focused primarily on preventing North Korea from creating a nuclear bomb.  While this goal is essential, broadening the scope of these talks to cover a broad range of regional issues could improve the 6-party talk’s chances of survival in the future and help to create peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Broadening the 6-party talk’s focus to discussing regional issues allows a more sustainable and fruitful dialogue to begin.  This change of emphasis will allow North Korea to engage with the rest of the region on various issues that concern them, while simultaneously giving an avenue to America, plus the other actors in the region to engage them on peacekeeping issues.  To entice North Korea to join such an institution, participating members should provide a constant supply of aid to the country in terms of fuel and food.  Because North Korea engages in belligerent behavior when they are suffering from severe food shortages or economic desperation, this aid should dampen provocations. 

The sad fact is that at present, peace on the Peninsula benefits every actor in the region except for North Korea.  Creating an institution where dialogue can occur between America and the other actors in the region has the potential to change this fact.  For if history holds true, when North Korea is negotiating, it is also silencing its weapons.